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Abstract: In the latest edition of The Present State of Scholarship in 
the History of Rhetoric, Lynne Lewis Gaillet (2010) laments the 
continuing broad absence of work on nineteenth-century 
Continental theory: “[Donald] Stewart predicted that the next 
edition of The Present State would include works by and about 
Continental European rhetoricians,” and she then notes that 
despite  “headway made by scholars in other rhetorical periods, 
the nineteenth-century has not made great strides toward this 
goal” (p. 169). One such Continental European rhetorician, 
Gustave Le Bon, has indeed been largely displaced in histories of 
rhetoric, despite evidence that he influenced not merely the 
rhetoric as an intellectual discipline but the rhetorical practices 
of important historical figures. This article is an attempt to place 
Le Bon in the continuum of rhetorical history between the 19th 
and 20th century.  
Key words: rhetoric, Le Bon, history 
 
Abstrak: Dalam edisi terbaru The Present State of Scholarship di 
History of Rhetoric, Lynne Lewis Gaillet (2010) menyesalkan tidak 
adanya  karya yang begitu luas pada teori Kontinental abad ke-19: 
“[Donald] Stewart meramalkan bahwa edisi berikutnya dari The Present 
State akan termasuk karya oleh dan tentang retorika benua Eropa, "dan 
dia kemudian mencatat bahwa meskipun" kemajuan yang dibuat oleh 
para sarjana dalam periode retoris lainnya, abad kesembilan belas belum 
membuat langkah besar menuju tujuan ini "(hal. 169). Salah satu 
retorika Eropa Kontinental, Gustave Le Bon, memang telah banyak 
salah meletakkan  dalam sejarah retorika, meskipun ada bukti bahwa ia 
tidak hanya mempengaruhi retorika sebagai disiplin intelektual tetapi 
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praktik retoris dari tokoh-tokoh sejarah yang penting. Artikel ini adalah 
upaya untuk menempatkan Le Bon dalam rangkaian sejarah retoris 
antara abad ke-19 dan ke-20. 
Kata kunci:  retorik, Le Bon, sejarah 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Describing Le Bon as a rhetorician is not mere reaching by definition. 
The foremost scholar of Le Bon’s life and work has stated that Le Bon’s intent 
when writing his most influential work, Psychologie des Foules, was to instruct a 
hypothetical statesman how “crowds are moved by ‘images, words, and 
formulas’” and offered “a short lesson in the art of persuasion through 
rhetoric” (Nye, 1975, p. 77). Le Bon himself confirmed that this was his intent, 
and Psychologie reads like a conceptual manual for mass communication at a 
time when the technological means to effect this was limited mostly to print 
and public assemblies. Further proof of Psychologie’s intent as a rhetoric 
becomes clear in Le Bon’s rhetorical theories in a 1917 essay, “La Persuasion,” 
which is only available as a manuscript, but is essentially a restatement of his 
theories of persuasion in digest form. Although Psychologie has long been 
identified as a rhetorical treatise, it remains largely neglected by historians of 
rhetoric, in spite of its demonstrable role in shaping the rhetoric of the 
modern era until recently. In Jay Childer’s article, “Fearing the Masses: 
Gustave Le Bon and Some Undemocratic Roots of Modern Rhetorical 
Studies”, Childers (2014) explains that Le Bon “popularized the notion that 
the masses were like a psychological crowd devoid of reason and the ability to 
deliberate” (p. 76). Childers (2014) has provided valuable connections to Le 
Bon’s persistence in the discipline of speech communication well into the 20th 
century. This article will demonstrate that his influence on continental cultural 
practice was even more significant, and that he represents a bridge between 
19th century scientism in rhetorical theory and the re-emergence of the 
rhetorical tradition in the 20th century, where conventional histories have left 
him largely unmoored and under-historicized. 
Building on the work of Childers (2014), we will explore Le Bon’s 
rhetoric as having its roots in the prevailing medical and biological theories 
from Le Bon’s time. These scientistic theories shaped not only the rhetorical 
manuals and theories of the nineteenth century, but shaped totalitarian 
oratory and politics quite directly through Benito Mussolini and (in strong 
likelihood) the Third Reich, thereby affecting – however indirectly –Burke 
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(2006), at least in terms of his reaction to Hitler’s Mein Kampf. This article 
extends the analysis of Le Bon’s rhetoric by examining mass persuasion as 
contagion (as contagion was understood before 1896) and ultimately addresses 
Le Bon’s significance as a figure bridging the history between 19th and 20th 
century rhetoric. 
 
LE BON, CONTAGION THEORY AND THE HISTORICAL 
TRAJECTORY OF 19TH CENTURY RHETORIC 
The theory of persuasion as social contagion was never fully articulated 
by most 19th century intercontinental rhetorics, and indeed, at first blush one 
might regard Le Bon, his theories, and influence as a sort of freakish anomaly. 
On closer examination, Le Bon should be studied because precisely because he 
fits within certain trends in the development of 19th century rhetoric, and 
serves as an explanation for 20th century rhetorical theories and practices 
which have not been fully historicized—or characterized as existing “outside” 
conventional rhetorical history.  His omission is likely owing to Nan Johnson’s 
most salient critique of 19th century rhetoric as it was previously historicized, 
which, she explains, conflated 19th century rhetoric with writing instruction 
(1991, p. 13). As Walzer and Beard aptly summarize, such histories 
“fallaciously assumed that a history of how writing was taught constituted a 
history of rhetoric as a discipline” (2009, p. 18). In Le Bon, we find a rhetoric 
theoretically and practically tailored to civic discourse, (though not, as Childers 
points out, democratic civic discourse). 
Ferreira-Buckley (1996) has observed that 19th century rhetoric exhibited 
emerging trends such as scientism and phrenology, of which Le Bon was a 
leading advocate.  In fact, Le Bon invented the “pocket cephalometer” (with 
which he used to measure the skulls of unsuspecting persons). In many 
transcontinental rhetoric written prior to Le Bon, rhetoric was described as a 
“science” with many notable examples in widespread circulation in classrooms. 
Johnson’s thesis (1991) that 19th century rhetoric was essentially synthetic, and 
one essential component was its “epistemological approaches to rhetoric as a 
‘science’ closely related to the study of the ‘mental faculties’” is demonstrated 
in these rhetoric (p. 14). Explaining the more basic components of the “New 
Rhetoric” of the 19th century, Johnson (1991) explains that “the study of 
rhetoric” was viewed as “a science” capable of revealing the “basic principles of 
nature” (p. 67). We see in Le Bon an extension of these approaches but 
deriving mass psychology and epidemiology, such as it was in 1896.  
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Hill (1877) in The Science of Rhetoric defined rhetoric as “the science of 
the laws of effective discourse” (p. 37) which was loosely based around field 
psychology. Bascom (1866) in Philosophy of Rhetoric described rhetoric as a 
“mental and moral science” (p. 15). As a very first principle, Hart (1882) 
explains in Manual of Composition and Rhetoric that “Rhetoric is the science 
which treats all discourse” (p. 17). True to the tendency in rhetorical theory of 
his day, Le Bon promises at the outset of his work to examine the “problem” 
of crowds in a “purely scientific manner”, and explains that his theories, which 
may go against the grain of prevailing crowd theories, should nevertheless be 
accepted as more wholesomely scientific than the alternative (v). Hauntingly, 
he states “A man of science bent on verifying a phenomenon is not called 
upon to concern himself with the interests his verifications may hurt” (vi).  
Le Bon finally bridges the gap between rhetoric and science when he 
offers a cue, as to the rhetorical intent of his work: “The art of those who 
govern, as is the case with the art of advocates, consists above all in the science 
of employing words” (p. 105).  In the writings of Le Bon, 19th century 
scientism (specifically medical science relating to contagion) became writ large 
as a central means of persuasion in his overall schema. Le Bon’s rhetorical 
theories, grounded in physiological processes, are not more novel than 
Alexander Bain’s (1867). Bain's theories, too, emerged from “forging the link 
between physiology and psychology” which synthesized an “analytic structure” 
for his rhetoric. Le Bon’s rhetoric extrapolates his conclusions from the 
emerging science of both mass psychology and cellular physiological processes, 
and thus fits in this continuum of scientific thinking.  
A final reason Le Bon should be a subject of inquiry for historians of 
rhetoric is that his rhetoric functions as a widely influential bridge between the 
scientism of the 19th and 20th centuries, while also explaining a great deal about 
rhetorical practice in the public sphere not accounted for in other early 
rhetorician’s work like Burke and Richards. 
 As Connors (1991) critique of the dearth of scholarship in 19th century 
rhetoric pointed out, many years ago, conventional rhetorical histories left off 
with “Campbell, Blair and Whately” and picked up again in the “1920s, with 
I.A. Richards and Kenneth Burke” (p. 50). Le Bon’s theory, grounded in both 
the social and biological science of his day – such as it was – creates a much 
more clearer and influential continuum that was not scholarly, but civic, and 
often had terrifying consequences. 
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LE BON AND THE TOTALITARIAN STATE  
For those unfamiliar with Le Bon in the context of his historical milieu, 
a fundamental factual introduction might be useful. Psychologie was an overt 
rhetorical manual with not only broad influence but a demonstrable influence 
on the modern period’s rhetorical praxis. Not only is his rhetorical theory a 
natural extension of scientistic psychological principles found throughout the 
19th century, but Le Bon was a vital link between 19th century rhetoric and 
scientistic public discourse in the decades after Psychologie’s publication in 
1896. His treatise functioned as a means for emerging totalitarian states to 
form rhetorical policy, mainly through speechifying, display, and ultimately 
propaganda. Though a physician by training, Le Bon (1841-1931) had a long 
career and wrote over twenty books, and his most notable success and 
influence came with his rhetorical treatise which synthesized and repurposed 
French crowd psychology to persuasive. Le Bon’s theories in Psychologie were 
printed hundreds of thousands of times and translated into seventeen 
languages.  
While Le Bon has been mostly uncontextualized in discussions of 
nineteenth-century continental rhetoricians, he has not been entirely ignored. 
Robert A. Nye (1975), the leading scholar of Le Bon’s work, attaches two 
causes to his neglect: Le Bon and the French academy had a mutual antipathy 
to one another during his lifetime, and the academy steadfastly refused to 
study his works. This was likely exacerbated posthumously, due to his rather 
direct connection to fascism in the early twentieth century and an ambient 
cultural stigma in France toward Vichy sympathizers, real or ideological. But 
just as in American scholarship, Le Bon has had academic attention from 
scholars such as Marpeau (2000), largely in the context of cultural and 
biographical studies1  Before Childers, only Nye, himself a historian, traced Le 
Bon’s influence in nations such as Turkey, Rumania, Japan, and most notably, 
many nations of Western Europe (Nye, 1975, pp. 165-167). One of the early 
adaptors of Le Bon’s theories, and possibly the most notorious, was none other 
than Benito Mussolini, with whom Le Bon became friends with later in life.  
In an interview with Pierre Chanlaine, Mussolini claimed, “much that Le 
Bon wrote in his Psychologie des Foules had been useful to him in addressing 
crowds. Speaking directly and forcefully to the crowd itself, and establishing a 
rapport based on foreknowledge of the composition of the group were 
                                                        
1 See generally Gustave Le Bon. Parcours d’un intellectuel 1841-1931, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 
2000. 
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important elements which Mussolini claimed to have found in Le Bon’s book” 
(Nye, 1975, p. 178). Chanlaine further reported that “Mussolini related to him 
his satisfaction with Le Bon’s principle of ‘affirmation’… He laughed with 
satisfaction as he told of how he could vigorously state a principle to the 
crowd, then ask them ‘isn’t that so?’ to which they would reply ‘si Duce, si 
Duce’” (Chanlaine as cited in Nye, 1975, p. 179). Perhaps even more 
noteworthy is the argument – only speculative - originally posited by Stein 
(1955), that a translation of Le Bon’s book was formative to Hitler (1939, p. 
179). Other scholars, without drawing a direct connection to Le Bon, have 
noted the influence of massenpsychologie on the oratorical practices of the Third 
Reich (see generally Bosaijman; Iezzi, 1959). While recognizing that the 
assertion would be difficult to prove, Nye (1975) points out that Hitler’s 
statements on the nature of his oratory in relation to his audience share 
haunting conceptual ground with the theories of Le Bon. Surprisingly, 
however, it was not only fascist states that found LeBon’s work useful. In 1914, 
Theodore Roosevelt asked specifically to meet Le Bon during a visit to Paris 
(Barrows, 1981, p. 179).   
There is a long history of rhetorical analyses of fascist rhetoric, going 
back at least as far as Kenneth Burke’s 1941 essay “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s 
‘Battle’” in which he analyzed Mein Kampf in order to “discover what kind of 
‘medicine’ this medicine-man has concocted, that we may know, with greater 
accuracy, exactly what to guard against, if we are to forestall the concocting of a 
similar medicine in America” (2006, p. 149). Indeed, Nazi rhetoric led many to 
question and study the ethical problems inherent in rhetoric. There have been 
numerous analyses of totalitarian rhetoric analyzing its internal strategies. This 
approach continued with Corbett’s “Rhetoric of the Closed Fist” (1969). Katz 
(1992), too, has noted an ethical rhetorical problem evidenced in Nazi memos, 
where he claims that through an “ethic of expediency, rhetoric was made to 
serve the holocaust” (p. 257).  
Yet the era of fascism was certainly not the first time rhetoricians noticed 
the propensity of rhetoric to be used for unethical ends. Indeed, long before 
Hitler, Mussolini, and other twentieth-century fascists, Cicero (2001) noted 
this dangerous aspect of rhetoric: “Eloquence is one of the supreme virtues; 
and the stronger this faculty is, the more necessary it is for it to be combined 
with integrity and supreme wisdom, and if we bestow fluency of speech on 
persons devoid of those virtues, we shall not have made orators of them, but 
shall have put weapons into the hands of madmen” (p. 55). The possibility of 
rhetoric’s ill-use has led some as far as to claim rhetoric entirely vacuous and 
useless in an age of scientific inquiry, but Le Bon, himself a physician, used 
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scientific ideas as a key component of his theory of rhetoric and contagion. This 
concept is the least explained of his rhetorical theory, and the bulk of this 
article investigates the connections between rhetoric and contagion. Le Bon’s 
theory of persuasion is a clear expression of scientism in 19th century rhetoric 
and was consistent with others in his day. We will return to Le Bon’s future 
influence later, but first this article shows how Le Bon’s scientism shaped his 
rhetorical theory in the 19th century. 
 
LE PSYCHOLOGIE DES FOULES AND THE CONTAGION OF IDEAS 
Le Bon was trained as a physician and attempted to enter the academe 
by studying race theory, anthropology, and phrenology. He was so convinced 
of the racial superiority of Europeans that much of his work operated on the 
assumption that the various races of humanity were arranged hierarchically, 
with Europeans being at the top (see generally Les Lois Psychologiques de 
l'Évolution des Peuples). As a physical scientist, he believed in the existence of the 
aether, “black light” and mesmerism as an instrument of social control. His 
racism, elitism, racism, nationalism, and pseudo-scientific beliefs put him 
squarely in line with many components of fascist ideology. His exclusion from 
social scientific circles in his own historical milieu only served as further 
impetus for the development of his political thought—a thought marked by 
antipathy for democratic institutions and processes. His belief in the 
organization of audiences as a subhuman organism with cellular integrity is 
central to a contextual analysis of his rhetorical theory. Le Bon’s training as a 
physician was formative to his theory of social contagion, a theory which had 
rhetorical dimensions; the three principal means of persuasion cited by Le Bon 
was “affirmation, repetition, and contagion” (p. 117). Although contagion is 
perhaps the least-discussed element of these means of mass persuasion in 
Psychologie, it is safe to assume that a physician’s understanding of contagion in 
1896 would be significantly at variance from our own, but also significant for 
the further examination of Le Bon’s theories. 
Le Bon’s stated intent in composing Psychologie was not merely to write a 
popularizing rhetoric but to clinically offer this advice to control and 
manipulate the social “sickness” of crowd behavior with medical theories of 
control which operated by contagion.  It should be said that Le Bon expressed 
genuine antipathy for rhetoric in an academic sense or in the sense of public 
oratory. No less, Le Bon’s work is noted for the rhetorical utility of his theories 
and instructions for an orator who might utilize them. For example, he wrote, 
Ramsey, S.D., Gustave Le Bon, Rhetoric as Mass Contagion, and 19th Century        237 
Rhetoric  
https://doi.org/10.24167/celt.v17i2;  ISSN: 1412-3320 (print); ISSN: 2502-4914 (online); Accredited; DOAJ 
 
“To know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds is to know at the 
same time the art of governing them” (92). Le Bon, separating himself from 
the rhetorical tradition in both its educational tradition and its civic tradition, 
drew on the scientism of the nineteenth-century sociological and 
anthropological currents of human “science” in his day. Le Bon sets forth both 
rhetorical precepts, a description of an ideal orator, and strategies to appeal to 
audiences (which he terms crowds) based on assumptions about their non-
rationality: “The laws of logic have no action on a crowd. To bring home 
conviction to crowds it is necessary first of all understand the sentiments by 
which they are animated, to pretend to share these sentiments, then to 
endeavor to modify them…” (pp. 112-113). In Le Bon’s rhetorical schema, the 
goal of the ideal orator is to manipulate words and concepts, which is based in 
a theory of language that presumes a non-rational relationship between the 
signifier and signified, and accordingly theorizes the ideal means of non-
rational persuasion through image, symbol, analogy, association, and 
repetition which has as its final component contagion to form, or more 
precisely control, the illness of mass psychological bodies. Contagion is 
perhaps the least defined of these components, and so we must turn to 
theories of contagion in the medical ideas of his day. 
Le Bon’s rhetorical treatise had its conceptual foundation in the 
language of French mesmerism, racial theory, and, most significantly, the 
thought of “L’Ecole de Paris”, whose main interests have been defined as 
broadly embracing “mental activity” concretely manifested, “the life of and the 
transformation of mental images, the relationship of emotion to organic rhythms,” 
(Nye, 1975, p. 65). In sum, Le Bon was synthesizing a rhetorical theory based 
on early scientific ideas of non-rational behavior as exemplified in biological, 
involuntary processes, and collective psychology. To know the title of his 
restatement is enough to drive home the point: Psychologie’s purpose was to 
present a rhetoric aimed at social control based on the premise of biological 
automatism, and the agent of infecting and curing biological automata was 
contagion. This could be described based on contemporary theories of 
contagion in vogue in his time, which led him to conceive of persuasion as a 
form of pathogenic psychological warfare. 
 
RHETORIC AS PATHOGENIC PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTROL  
Le Psychologie des Foules, then, was highly influenced by Le Bon’s disgust 
for the general public and democratic institutions. In the mid-twentieth 
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century, Hannah Arendt (2007) explained, “if the few are the wisest, then they 
are according to Plato those who cannot persuade the multitude and must rule 
over unwilling subjects through violence” (p. 943). Le Bon presented his 
theories first by investigating the “general characteristics” of crowds and then 
with chapters on the remote and immediate factors of the opinions and beliefs 
of crowds and the limitations of crowds. Then, finally, with Chapter 9, Le Bon 
presents “The Leaders of Crowds and Their Means of Persuasion.” In this 
chapter, which we will focus on, he identifies the qualities of successful leaders 
and their use for affirmation, repetition, and most importantly contagion as the 
biological weapon of ideological infections that are the primary means of 
rhetors. It is this latter concept that is our focus, but we must first explicate Le 
Bon’s understanding of the crowd as organic body.  
Le Bon begins Le Psychologie by explaining that he is not simply referring 
to a mass of people when he uses the word crowd but “a provisional being 
formed of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are combined, exactly 
as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion a new being which 
displays characteristics very different from those possessed by each of the cells singly” (p. 
30). This bears careful contextual understanding as not a mere metaphorical 
utterance but a comprehension of cellular theory as Le Bon, the physician, 
understood it. L. Wolpert’s study of cell theory before 1895 explains that 
vegetable cellular theory had been limitedly observed and understood since 
Robert Hooke’s study in 1665 (Wolpert, 1995, p. 265). Cellular theory 
however went through various phases until approximately 1833 when such 
theories began to connect the animal and cellular theories of tissue and 
cohesion, with various arguments that they were connected fibrously or in a 
‘globular’ manner (p.229). But in any case, the history reveals that well into the 
time of Le Bon’s clinical training in the mid-nineteenth century, however it 
was styled, there was a belief in a kind of “vital force” or unifying energy that 
was responsible for cellular action and cohesion (p. 229). It was in 1889 that 
the cutting edge of cellular study still believed cellular material was 
“protoplasmic” but had still not accounted for individual cells possessing 
membranes that separated and differentiated them from one another (p. 230). It had 
still not been established until a year before the appearance Le Psychologie.  
In terms of Le Bon’s rhetorical theory of pathogenesis and the cellular 
nature of rhetorical subjects, it must be understood that he regarded an 
audience as a mass of undifferentiated tissue, much like a protoplasmic mass of 
cells in one organism. If such a mass had no delineation or cellular wall 
between one and the other, then a pathogen could suddenly and with 
astonishing rapidity infect the organism entirely not merely by transfer 
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between distinct units but through the aether itself; indeed, Le Bon believed 
that the mere presence of a pathogenic persuasion could change the minds and 
actions of mass audiences. The cellular audience is heterogenous, as he 
explains, regardless of functional differences, and can be collectively controlled 
by virtue of its collective presence.  As a physician, the undifferentiated tissues 
of the body of the crowd should be treated like cells, without differentiating 
and separating structures, indeed, the paradox of the part and the whole that 
derived from the 19th century medical theory of organic unity, from which he 
derives one of his earliest rhetorical “laws”. 
More commonly referred to today as “mob mentality,”  Le Bon’s crowd, 
further, does not require that all members of the crowd be in a single place 
together: “Thousands of isolated individuals may acquire at certain moments 
… the characteristics of a psychological crowd” (p. 3). He further explains that 
crowds have an organic mental unity, centrally characterized by “impulsiveness, 
irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical 
spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments”, in sum, susceptibility to illness and 
infection (p. 17). When multiple people gather together, Le Bon explains, they 
become a “single being” and are subject to “the law of the mental unity of crowds” 
(p. 2). Le Bon was attempting to articulate a theory of persuasion based on 
medical research in vogue since the 1880s, in which scientists were attempting 
to argue against the “mechanistic” explanation of biological processes on prior 
centuries. Edmund Montgomery, who has been called a "Pioneer of 
Organicism," argued in 1880 to further the logical foundations of organic 
unity, and probably influenced Le Bon’s rhetorical conceptions of cellular 
unity. As Philips (1970) explains, “In his article ‘The Unity of the Organic 
Individual,’ published in 1882, [Montgomery] mentioned his studies on cells 
and stated that he had come to the conclusion that the fundamental entity is 
not the individual cell, but the organism as a whole” (p. 426). Thus, to Le Bon, 
the objects or bodies to be persuaded are aggregate cells with whole functions, 
and not a set of individuals.  
Because organicism, though logically flawed, was high science in the 
years preceding Psychologie, Le Bon’s theories of rhetoric and the scientism 
associated with them stemmed not from a mere contempt for assemblies of 
people acting in concert but from what he perceived as the bleeding edges of 
the science of life.  Montgomery summarized that “The organism is prior to its 
tissues, the tissues prior to their supposed elements. The centralised organism 
is not, as universally assumed, a multiple of ultimate units, but is, on the 
contrary, itself one single individuality” (p. 326). The idea that audiences 
(“crowds”) functioned as an organic unit, an idea that implicates biological 
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systems theory, finds a conceptual corollary in 19th century medical science 
which posits that “processes occurring in living things could be understood 
only when the features of the whole organism were considered. The organism 
was a functioning unit, and it was this unit which determined the 
characteristics of the constituent parts, not vice-versa. The piecemeal 
examination of the parts, they were suggesting, would not lead to an 
understanding of the whole” (Philips, 1970, p. 427).  Thus, Le Bon’s 
examination of the rhetoric which affected crowds as an organic whole, and 
not their constituent parts, was a logical step in his attempt to create a 
synthetic theory of mass persuasion. 
Thus, to Le Bon, the mental unity of mass audiences is such that when 
an individual becomes a member of a crowd: “the mere fact that he forms 
part” of a biological organization that when isolated, “he may be a cultivated 
individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct” (p. 
13). The biological “law” in Le Bon’s rhetorical theory is not mere metaphor 
but had very real intellectual antecedents, as it took little time and few logical 
steps for thinkers such as Haldane (1883) to extend biological and cellular 
organicism to social groupings: “When we have reached a standpoint from 
which we refuse to separate the individual organism from its surroundings and 
from its relation to other individuals, we see how the species may itself be 
looked upon as a compound organism” (p. 58).  
 
FROM ORGANIC UNITS TO PATHOGENS 
Having explained the foundation of rhetorical contagion theory, the 
next logical piece of Le Bon’s puzzle as to the means of the transmission of 
ideas is contagion theory itself. The precise meaning of this term as Le Bon the 
physician might have understood it while writing Psychologie in 1894-1895 
bears theoretical historical analysis. Rudolph Virchow, an early pathologist in 
Europe, preceded Pasteur and laid the groundwork for the theory of contagion 
as Le Bon would have come to understand it. In 1858 he published a famous 
text, “Cellular Pathology,” which according to Santer “contained the 
theoretical basis for his disease theory” (p. 239). Virchow used microscopic 
research “to establish the principle that all tissues in the body were composed 
of cells. He promulgated the axiom that ‘every cell comes from another cell: 
from it [the cell] emanate all the activities of life both in health and sickness’” 
(p. 239). Building on cellular theory, Louis Pasteur, “fundamentally opposed a 
living agent theory of disease and fermentation” (p. 246). The alternative theory 
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was that microbes were somehow spontaneously generated, but around 1859 
Pasteur showed microbial life itself could exist in air and this discovery gave 
rise to his most influential lecture, in which he extended the idea of contagious 
causation to larger social issues of his day – much like Le Bon later did. Pasteur 
underscored the importance of his research by explaining it as a building block 
to solving the questions of his day—confronting the nineteenth century 
theological imagination, which might explain “The unity or multiplicity of 
human races; the creation of man several thousand years or several thousand 
centuries ago; the fixity of the species or the slow and progressive 
transformation of one species into another” (Geison, 1995, pp. 110-111) 
Pasteur’s lecture was generally aimed at combating the theory known as 
“spontaneous generation” of microbial life which was still under some debate 
through the work of Cohn in LeBon’s lifetime. If Cohn’s work was accepted 
for purposes of Le Bon’s rhetorical theory, it would theorize that audiences 
form their opinions spontaneously and without the intervention of a living 
agent. Huxley (1886) dispelled this idea in the field of biology with his 
influential essay, “On the Physical Basis or the Matter of Life.” The ideas 
contained in this seminal essay were a powerful argument against a theory of 
spontaneous generation. He argued for the interconnectedness of all living 
creatures, arguing that “a unity of power . . . a unity of form, and a unity of 
substantial composition; does pervade the whole living world” (p. 451). This 
unity gives life to the protoplasmic theory of cellular cohesion (still in vogue in 
the time of Le Bon) which Le Bon extended to the notions of cellular groups 
of people.  
A further relevant scientific theory could further explain Le Bon’s 
understanding of contagion as a rhetorical principle. In the British Medical 
Journal, Simon (1879) offered a theory of contagion in “An Essay on 
Contagion: Its Nature and Mode of Action”. He opened the essay by asking 
the crucial question: What is the nature of the contagious matter? On this 
date, if this question had been put to Pasteur, or other later and more 
influential microbial theorists, they would have designated the cause as a living 
agent. But to Simon, “disease was not simply a catalytic process leading to 
breakdown of organic matter”; it was instead a constructive process (Santer, 
2015, p. 269). We must remember that rhetorical action, too, is a constructive 
process conducted by living agents. By the late 1870s, it was generally conceded 
and expanded by the work of Robert Koch that infection was not merely causal 
but necessary to contagious action (p. 270). To Le Bon, social action and the 
rhetoric that it was predicated upon must therefore bear similitude. Without 
more exhaustive scientific history, it might suffice to say that after the 
242  Celt: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching & Literature, 
Volume 17, Number 2, December 2017, pp. 230 – 249 
https://doi.org/10.24167/celt.v17i2;  ISSN: 1412-3320 (print); ISSN: 2502-4914 (online); Accredited; DOAJ 
 
experiments of Cohn and by the time of the composition of Psychologie, the 
living agent theory had been conceded at least in part as one cause of 
contagion.   
This of course brings us to a more central question: what is the role of 
the living agent of persuasion (the vector of pathogenic ideas) in Le Bon’s 
scientistic schema of persuasion? Le Bon’s argument relating the process of 
contagion and therefore the process of persuasion would seem to stem from a 
false analogy, namely that humans, socially, are analogous to cellular 
complexes in social groupings. But historically, his assertions as to the results 
possible through his pathogenic rhetorical theory proved to be entirely possible. 
Emerging totalitarian states were so convinced of the viability Le Bon’s theory 
of the bio-psychological control through infection and subsequent contagion 
that, as Le Bon had asserted was possible, they adopted it in practice to 
persuade audiences to kill millions of other people: “Making part of a crowd, 
he is conscious of the power given to him by number, and it is sufficient to 
suggest to him ideas of murder … for him to yield immediately to temptation” 
(p. 15). Le Bon cites historical examples where such suggestions render 
casualties in the millions (p. 111). 
For historical reasons and genuine anti-democratic sentiment, Le Bon 
believed that morbidity and destruction as a result of crowd action were 
inevitable and that the rhetor’s role should be similar to that of a physician: to 
control and curtail the process of disease. Le Bon presents contagion as a part 
of the organic model of crowd persuasion he outlined earlier in the book 
claiming, “ideas, sentiments, emotions, and beliefs possess in crowds a 
contagious power as intense as that of microbes” (p. 12). He spends the most 
time discussing contagion, yet despite this lengthy discussion it is unclear how 
contagion works. Rather, Le Bon implies that this is a natural phenomenon 
resulting from the very psychology of a crowd. “Contagion is a phenomenon of 
which it is easy to establish the presence, but that it is not easy to explain. It 
must be classed among those phenomena of a hypnotic order” (p. 10). Le Bon 
goes on to say that repetitive suggestions are such that “every sentiment and act 
is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily 
sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest” (p. 10).  Despite this 
lack of explanation, it is clear that through repetition and affirmation a rhetor 
can prompt an idea or belief to become contagious. Le Bon, rather than 
suggesting a “cure” for a contagion, offers an instruction in the introduction of 
these contagions to treat the body of the audience. To Le Bon, the contagion is 
immediate and based in the brain and spinal cord of the audience, and 
uniform in spite of individual temperaments (pp. 18-22). The very presence of 
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a crowd limits the individual’s logical faculties so that when prompted with 
affirmation and repetition the idea presented by the leader (whether logical or 
not) will become contagious.  Further, Le Bon argues that it is contagion that 
allows members of the crowd to accept ideas that are contrary to their own best 
interest. Contagions begin with special human-produced “illusions” which can 
even induce hallucinatory states, as “Brain disorders, like madness, are 
themselves contagious. The frequency of madness among doctors who are 
specialists for the mad is notorious” (p. 128). The orator inducing madness in 
crowds contagiously can thus himself become mad. 
 
LEADERS OF CROWDS: THE VECTOR OF CONTAGION 
These crowds, so suggestible and instinctual, need something (rhetoric) 
and someone (a rhetorician) to move them to action. Le Bon explains, 
“Notwithstanding all of its progress, philosophy has been unable as yet to offer 
the masses any ideal that can charm them; but, as they must have their 
illusions at all cost, they turn instinctively, as the insect seeks the light, to the 
rhetoricians who accord them what they want” (p. 109). Perhaps surprisingly, Le 
Bon does not find leaders and rhetoricians to be men of great intellect, but 
rather men of action, “especially recruited from the ranks of those morbidly 
nervous, excitable, half-deranged persons who are bordering on madness. 
However absurd may be the idea they uphold of the goal they pursue, their 
convictions are so strong that all reasoning is lost upon them” (p. 119). Despite 
recognizing the leader’s importance—“a crowd is a servile flock incapable of 
ever doing without a master” (p. 118)—, he claims these rhetorical leaders are 
just as irrational as the crowd: “hypnotized [sic] by the idea, whose apostle he 
has since become. It has taken possession of him to such a degree that 
everything outside it vanishes, and that every contrary opinion appears to him 
an error or a superstition” (p. 118). Clearly, both Mussolini and Hitler fit this 
description, so entranced by their beliefs as to lead their countries with the 
misplaced idea that they could conquer the world.  
While Le Bon sees faith as an essential characteristic of a leader, these 
leaders cannot have great power unless “they acquire in time that mysterious 
force known as prestige” (p. 132). He further explains that:  
Prestige in reality is a sort of domination exercised on our mind by an 
individual, a work, or an idea. This domination entirely paralyses our critical 
faculty, and fills our soul with astonishment and respect. The sentiment 
provoked is inexplicable, like all sentiments, but it would appear to be of the 
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same kind as the fascination to which a magnetized [sic] person is subjected. 
Prestige is the mainspring of all authority (p. 133). 
Le Bon further explains that acquired prestige can result from fortune, 
position, titles, or even uniforms while personal prestige, possessed by the great 
leaders of crowds, seems to result from a person’s ability to fascinate those 
around him or her. Le Bon goes as far as to claim that those with this personal 
prestige can “ill-treat men as you will, massacre them by millions, be the cause 
of invasion upon invasion, all is permitted you if you possess prestige in a 
sufficient degree and the talent necessary to uphold it” (pp. 140-141). Le Bon 
further argues that prestige “constitutes the fundamental element of 
persuasion” (p. 144). Rather than a physician whose function, traditionally is 
to heal, the rhetorical physician of Le Bon could himself be the agent of mass 
destruction using a kind of rhetorical epidemiology calculated to divide and 
destroy by contagion, or to quarantine ideological illness by inoculation with a 
different kind of contagion. Social control is effected by biological weapon of 
thought and division. 
Having illustrated the affective dimensions of Le Bon’s theories and 
their foundation in 19th century biology, we now turn to the enduring 
scientistic metaphor of contagion as persuasion in a brief illustration of how it 
was manifested in civic rhetorical discourse in the 20th century. 
 
LE BON BETWEEN 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY RHETORIC  
As previously mentioned, the connection between Le Bon and the 
totalitarian oratory of figures like Mussolini have been so thoroughly 
established that they do not bear further examination. But an intriguing 
connection remains to be fully established between Le Bon and the Third 
Reich, and in turn Kenneth Burke’s reaction to the rhetoric of the Third 
Reich. We offer the following analysis not as scholars of critical texts written by 
figures such as Hitler to show this direct connection, but to show how Le 
Bon’s theories of contagion and persuasion pervaded continental totalitarian 
discourse.  It is possible a direct influence to Hitler’s rhetoric may never be 
conclusively established, but the following is offered as evidence that Le Bon’s 
ideas, perhaps through Italian fascism, were in general circulation and 
provided many of the rhetorical strategies in at least one foundational 
totalitarian document, namely Mein Kampf. We will not rehash the common 
knowledge of its pivotal influence and formative place in the ideology of the 
Third Reich but instead look only to the elements of persuasion and contagion 
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that echo the theories of Le Bon. At the center of Hitler’s strategy for offering 
his political philosophy lies a metaphor of illness and cure, implicating 
contagion, a nuance which was not lost on Burke. Hitler’s metaphorical 
discursive language regarding the “Jewish question” and likening groups of 
ethnic minorities to parasites has been the subject of previous arguments 
(Perry, 1983).  But fascist rhetoric and its foundational documents are shot 
through with the state being “sick” and totalitarianism as “the cure.” This was 
not lost on Burke. 
Throughout Hitler’s discourse on his prospective political plans for 
Germany in Mein Kampf, there is a recurring argumentative metaphor for the 
problem, and proposed solution, couched in the term kranheit (disease).  He 
explains that the only hope for Germany is a diagnosis of its disease: “just as 
bodily ailments can be cured only when their origin has been diagnosed, so 
also political disease can be treated only when it has been diagnosed” (p. 181). 
The loss of the war was a kind of good fortune, he concludes and that the 
“disease would have become chronic; whereas, in the acute form of the 
disaster, it at least showed itself clearly to the eyes of a considerable number of 
observers.”, likening the collapse of Germany to a death by plague, instead of a 
slow death by tuberculosis (p. 185). He argues that the disease must be arrested 
in its course: “the longer the germs of disease remain in the national body and 
the longer they are allowed to become an integral part of that body” (p. 186). 
Hitler blamed the free press for the spread of the rhetorical contagion, “this 
poison was allowed to enter the national bloodstream and infect public life 
without the Government taking any effectual measures to master the course of 
the disease” (p. 194). A similar indictment was offered in the creative arena: 
“Everywhere we find the presence of those germs which … bring about the ruin 
of our culture” and “In almost all the various fields of German art and culture 
those morbid phenomena may be observed” (p. 204). These examples illustrate 
Hitler’s belief in ideological contagion transmitted through rhetoric and public 
communication, or that the popular beliefs of the masses are spread like a 
contagion. The central failure of state rhetorical policies as a failure during 
wartime is summarized in Hitler’s brief reflection on the nature of propaganda 
and the nature of crowds: “The receptive powers of the masses are very 
restricted, and their understanding is feeble… effective propaganda must be 
confined to a few bare essentials and those must be expressed as far as possible 
in stereotyped formulas. These slogans should be persistently repeated” (p. 
148). The masses were “a vacillating crowd of human children” (p. 149). Le 
Bon’s theories in the context of morbidity, contagion, and the nature of 
communication are far too many throughout the work to number here. 
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Burke’s reaction to the mobilization of these scientific metaphors is 
telling. Burke (2016) initially describes Hitler’s text as “nauseating” and likens 
Hitler to a “medicine man” (p. 191). “Hitler found a panacea, a “cure for what 
ails you,” a “snakeoil,” that made such sinister unifying within his own nation 
possible” (p. 192). He describes the “’medicinal’ appeal of the Jew as 
scapegoat” as a proposed “’medicine’ for the Aryan people” (pp. 195-196). 
Hitler’s anti-Semitism, explains Burke, is not merely a medicine for Germany 
but for Hitler himself (p. 199). Germany’s parliamentary problems are a 
“symptom” of an illness in the nation, and Hitler’s racism is the “medicine” (p. 
201).  
In conclusion, he observes Hitler’s rhetorical strategy to have a major 
component of “endless repetition,” noting one strategy expressly advocated by 
Le Bon, while his whole critique is thematically constructed around the 
repetitive metaphor of sickness and cure in Mein Kampf. Though well beyond 
the scope of this article, it would be worthwhile to investigate just how familiar 
Burke was with Le Bon.  
What is clear, in any case, is that the scientistic rhetoric of Hitler and his 
tropes of repetition, held together throughout with the idea of contagion and 
cure, are hauntingly reminiscent of the theories of Le Bon, and serve as merely 
a narrow proof of Le Bon’s historical influence between the 19th and 20th 
century. It is more than plausible that without Le Bon’s rhetorical theory, this 
interchange would never have been written. 
This analysis is offered to show that Le Bon’s scientistic, 19th century 
rhetorical theory was a vital bridge between the rhetoric, for good or ill, that 
would shape modern discourse in the early 20th century (and arguably persists 
to this day). Perhaps Le Bon’s neglect until recent times is partly political, but 
also partly due to the fact that he is nearly unbearable to scrutinize from our 
historically-advised positions of privilege some 120 years after the publication 
of Psychologie.  
If we measure the importance of a given rhetoric based on its historical 
influence, dissemination, and social effects – that is, factors quite apart from 
how tidily it fits into our pseudo-narrative of a rarefied “rhetorical tradition” – 
a very different picture of rhetorical history emerges. If we seek to know what 
rhetoric is in our time and how it is being deployed either for or against us, we 
might be well-served to look to the past with more clinical scrutiny. 
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